The Fifth Circuit Gets It Wrong in Compaq v. Commissioner by Weisbach, David A. & Shaviro, Daniel N.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and
Economics Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
2002
The Fifth Circuit Gets It Wrong in Compaq v.
Commissioner
David A. Weisbach
Daniel N. Shaviro
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
David A. Weisbach & Daniel N. Shaviro, "The Fifth Circuit Gets It Wrong in Compaq v. Commissioner" ( John M. Olin Program in
Law and Economics Working Paper No. 142, 2002).
 CHICAGO 
JOHN M. OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 142 
(2D SERIES) 
 
 
 
The Fifth Circuit Gets It Wrong in Compaq v. Commissioner 
 
Daniel N. Shaviro and David A. Weisbach 
 
THE LAW SCHOOL 
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge at: 
The Chicago Working Paper Series Index: 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html 
 
The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=298277 
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
GETS IT WRONG IN 
COMPAQ v. COMMISSIONER
By Daniel N. Shaviro and 
David A. Weisbach
I. Introduction
Corporate tax shelters have received significant at-
tention in the last few years. While the magnitude of
potential problems is disputed, it is clear that the use
of black letter rules, unconstrained by some sort of
economic substance or business purpose requirement,
could lead to the elimination of wholesale swathes of
corporate income tax liability. There has also been dis-
pute about the ability of the Internal Revenue Service
to combat tax shelters without new tools, with some
arguing that disclosure and reliance on current sub-
stantive law is sufficient. Unmistakably, however, any
such ability of the IRS depends on courts to interpret
the economic substance/business purpose doctrines to
give the IRS a high probability of success when it finds
transactions aimed purely at wholesale elimination of
tax liability.
One reason the circuit courts
performed so poorly in Compaq and
IES is that they were confused by a
relatively novel tax sheltering twist. 
Several years ago, it seemed that courts were fulfill-
ing this role. A series of decisions on a variety of shel-
ters came out in favor of the government. This had
much to do with the role of the Tax Court in the initial
stages of the litigation, although appellate courts had
been backing the Tax Court in some decisions. But
lately there has been a run of taxpayer victories in the
appellate courts. Most recently, Compaq v. Commis-
sioner1 placed the Fifth Circuit alongside the Eighth
Circuit, in IES v. Commissioner,2 in reversing the Tax
Court and upholding a pair of purely tax-motivated
cross-border dividend stripping transactions.
Whatever the broader merits of specialist as com-
pared to generalist courts in tax matters, the recent
performance of the generalist appeals courts in this
area has frequently been appalling. They have too often
failed to understand the doctrines they are applying,
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This report argues that the recent decision of
the Fifth Circuit in Compaq v. Commissioner is
seriously misguided and may have adverse con-
sequences for the tax system if not reversed either
by the Supreme Court or legislatively. In par-
ticular, it criticizes the Fifth Circuit’s discussion
of the pre-tax profit and business purpose re-
quirements, and argues that these requirements
should be interpreted in light of the purpose that
antiabuse doctrines serve, which is to filter out
tax arbitrage transactions that appear likely to be
socially undesirable.
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the rationales for those doctrines, or the consequences
of taxpayer victories. The Fifth Circuit decision in Com-
paq makes this particularly clear. In this report, we
analyze what is wrong with Compaq (and IES), what
these decisions mean and their possible consequences,
and what should be done legislatively if not (as we
hope) reversed by the Supreme Court.
II. A Quick Primer on Tax Shelters
One reason the circuit courts performed so poorly
in Compaq and IES is that they were confused by a
relatively novel tax sheltering twist. Typically, tax shel-
ters rely on arbitraging current deductions against
deferred or excluded income, to create tax losses in
excess of economic losses. These transactions have in-
duced the development of anti-tax shelter doctrines
that emphasize the potential for pre-tax economic
profit (often lacking in these deals due to the need to
compensate the promoter). In Compaq and IES, how-
ever, the game was to arbitrage phantom taxable in-
come (from amounts paid as taxes to foreign govern-
ments) against foreign tax credits.
Given this modest innovation, sensible application
of the pre-tax economic profit doctrine required some
glimmer of comprehension of why it was developed,
what purposes it serves, and what the different types
of tax shelters have in common. This, however, was
evidently too much to ask of the circuit court judges in
Compaq and IES.
A. Tax Shelters Using Losses
Loss tax shelters typically rely on exclusion or defer-
ral, enhanced by tax arbitrage, to create tax benefits
that often are potentially unlimited. The classic case
remains (after all these years) Knetsch v. United States,3
in which an individual purported to borrow $4 million
at a 3.5 percent interest rate so that he could invest this
money, with the purported lender, at only a 2.5 percent
return that was tax-deferred. He thereby arranged to
earn $100,000 per year at a cost of $140,000 per year.
The transaction may initially remind one of the old
joke where someone says he is in the business of
making change, in the amount of five quarters for every
dollar. “How can you stay in business doing that?” he
is asked. “That’s easy,” he replies. “I make it up on
volume.” Knetsch, however, thought he had a better
rationale than this for the deal. Deducting $140,000 per
year (with no offsetting current inclusion) would go
well beyond merely making up his annual $40,000 pre-
tax loss (at least until the transaction unwound in an
anticipated 30 years), in an era when marginal tax rates
exceeded 90 percent.4 The Supreme Court, however,
struck down the transaction as a sham, finding that it
lacked economic substance and served no nontax busi-
ness purpose, as  evidenced by the lack of any
reasonable prospect of a pre-tax profit.5 Knetsch there-
fore ended up not even being permitted to deduct his
out-of-pocket loss.6
One can easily see why this decision was important
and meritorious, notwithstanding that the particular
black letter rules at issue had been changed six years
before the Supreme Court decision specifically to block
Knetsch-type deals. Arbitrages of this sort are potential-
ly unlimited. For example, Knetsch could just as easily
have purported to borrow and invest $40 million or for
that matter $4 billion, rather than just $4 million, if he
had needed more deductions. The circularity of the
transaction ensured that it would not subject him to
any downside economic risk, or alter market interest
rates even if thousands of taxpayers did the same deal.
The application of antiabuse doctrines is not limited
to “pure” tax arbitrages like Knetsch, where potential
volume is unlimited since “the taxpayer essentially
buys and sells [or borrows and lends] the same asset.”7
Even regarding genuine financial assets issued by true
third parties, the tax system may suffer if taxpayers
face no constraint on stripping favorable tax attributes
from the assets for use in arranging arbitrages. A well-
known example where the doctrines applied to the
purported purchase of a genuine third-party financial
asset is Goldstein v. Commissioner.8 In Goldstein, the
court treated a leveraged purchase of Treasury bonds
as a sham because the transaction created a pre-tax loss
and had no significant nontax motivation.
Antiabuse doctrines are needed to
impede transactions like those in
Knetsch and Goldstein because it is
impossible for drafters of the tax law
to anticipate each and every
interaction of the various tax rules. 
Antiabuse doctrines are needed to impede transac-
tions like those in Knetsch and Goldstein because it is
impossible for drafters of the tax law to anticipate each
and every interaction of the various tax rules. Inevit-
ably, there will be some unforeseen interaction of the
tax rules so that, if one arranges one’s affairs in just the
3364 U.S. 361 (1960).
4See Daniel N. Shaviro, “Knetsch v. United States and Judi-
cial Doctrines Combating Tax Avoidance,” forthcoming in
Paul Caron (ed.), Tax Stories (2003).
5It is worth noting that Knetsch’s chance of earning a pre-
tax profit was not actually zero. He had the right to keep on
earning at 2.5 percent without continuing to borrow further
amounts each year at 3.5 percent. Thus, if the prevailing
market interest rate at which he could borrow had dropped
sufficiently below 2.5 percent, he could have ended up profit-
ing before-tax from the transaction. This possibility did not,
however, sway either the Supreme Court or the two lower
courts that heard the case to rule in Knetsch’s favor.
6See Knetsch v. United States, 348 F.2d 932 (Ct. Cl. 1965),
cert. denied 383 U.S. 957 (1966).
7C. Eugene Steuerle, Taxes, Loans, and Inflation: How the
Nation’s Wealth Becomes Misallocated 60 (Washington, D.C.,
Brookings Institution, 1985).
8364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 1005
(1967).
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right manner, magic happens. While these unforeseen
interactions can be corrected once they are discovered,
continual correction creates undue complexity and
prevents policymakers from focusing on other issues.
Moreover, if the corrections apply prospectively only,
this approach creates a rush to market as taxpayers and
promoters try to find new deals before they are shut
down.
The antiabuse doctrines try to stop this vicious circle
by interpreting the tax law so that odd interactions will
not produce tax benefits, at least when taxpayers pur-
posefully try to exploit them by arranging deals that
lack any significant economic significance and nontax
rationale. The doctrines thereby reduce the overall
complexity of the tax law, free policymakers to focus
on important issues, and reduce incentives on tax-
payers and their advisers to seek out and develop new
shelters.
A common complaint about antiabuse doctrines is
that they treat similarly situated taxpayers differently.
For example, the business purpose doctrine may result
in treating the same set of events differently based on
the purpose underlying their occurrence. However,
this is entirely consistent with many other fields of law
(think of the scienter requirement in securities law, the
good faith requirement on contract law, and so forth).
It also is good policy. Searching out and developing tax
shelters is an entirely wasteful activity. Engaging in
real business transactions is a useful activity. We have
good reasons to distinguish these types of transactions.
As Mark Gergen has put it, “you can pick up tax gold
if you find it in the street while going about your busi-
ness, but you cannot go hunting for it.”9
Another  common complaint  about  antiabuse
doctrines is that they inhibit so-called legitimate tax
planning. But we should always keep in mind that even
the most mundane tax planning is not the same as, say,
curing sick people, inventing a new product, or even
driving a bus. Waving the flag of legitimacy does not
turn tax planning into a productive activity, and if
effective antiabuse doctrines sometimes cover more
than we might ideally want, they do no real harm to
the economy. Concerns about over-breadth should not
prevent us from having effective antiabuse doctrines.10
A final crucial point about the antiabuse doctrines
is that they must be interpreted, as they are best ration-
alized, in terms of what they are trying to accomplish.
Why, one might ask, should we care how the taxpayers
in a transaction allocate the economic risks among them-
selves? Why require a reasonable prospect of pre-tax
profit when any economically rational taxpayer will only
care about the after-tax return? And why strike down
transactions where the expected pre-tax return is literally
negative, but not those where it is negative in an oppor-
tunity cost sense (for example, because you buy
municipal bonds that offer a lower pre-tax return than
otherwise identical corporate bonds)?
The answer is that the doctrines do not seek to
achieve logical precision, or to detect and reward moral
purity. They are instead simply devices for roughly
identifying a socially harmful set of transactions
without attacking those that Congress plainly meant to
encourage. The business purpose doctrine, the eco-
nomic substance doctrine, and related antiabuse
doctrines can be effective because taxpayers often
refuse to do these tax-motivated deals if required to
accept undesired economics, such as bearing sig-
nificant downside risk. Similarly, the requirement of
pre-tax profit is often effective because if you must pay
a shelter promoter a fee but are otherwise trying to do
nothing, you are almost bound to end up with a pre-tax
loss.11 Taxpayers engaging in real transactions accept
downside risk, have a purpose, bear changes in their
economic positions, and expect to make money. The
doctrines are merely rough sorting devices and, at a
minimum, should be interpreted to separate transac-
tions designed purely at wholesale tax elimination
from real business transactions. There is also no single
“correct” antiabuse rule that can be codified into a
mathematical formula that satisfies the tax lawyer’s
natural desire for tidiness. Instead, we use multiple,
sometimes conflicting doctrines, to try to filter out the
transactions that seem likely to be relatively bad.
B. Tax Shelters Involving Foreign Tax Credits
Historically, most tax shelters have involved the use
of tax arbitrage to create losses that can be used to
shelter other income from tax. However, shelters can
work just as well (or perhaps even better when mar-
ginal rates are so far below the 90 percent level of the
Knetsch era) by arbitraging credits, such as the foreign
tax credit, against phantom taxable income, with the
aim of sheltering other foreign-source income from
U.S. tax.
To illustrate a basic tax planning opportunity as-
sociated with foreign tax credits, suppose a U.S. mul-
tinational that is excess-limit makes a new investment
abroad, earning $100 that does not qualify for deferral
and paying $35 of foreign tax. This is a wash from a
U.S. tax standpoint, since the credit equals the U.S. tax
liability on the pre-foreign-tax income. Suppose, how-
9Mark Gergen, “The Common Knowledge of Tax Abuse,”
54 SMU L. Rev. 131, 140 (2001).
10Another common criticism of antiabuse doctrines is that
they violate congressional intent by denying the treatment
explicitly set forth by the statute. To the extent this argument
holds (and we question its validity in any event), it merely
shows the need for congressional action rather than that an-
tiabuse doctrines should be abandoned. In addition, Con-
gress has long legislated without protest against the back-
ground of antiabuse doctrines, going back at least to Gregory
v. Helvering, 69 F.2d 809 (2nd Cir. 1934), aff ’d 293 U.S. 465
(1935). Moreover, it would appear that in practice, Congress
more commonly codifies than reverses the bottom-line result
in antiabuse cases — as happened, for example, with respect
to the transactions at issue in Gregory, Knetsch, and Compaq.
11A pre-tax profit requirement may be ineffective, however,
if the taxpayer builds a positive return into the deal by ad-
vancing money to the promoter at a below-market but positive
interest rate. In effect, rather than paying the promoter $X, the
taxpayer accepts a market rate of return, minus $X, on the
associated loan.
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ever, that the multinational could arrange instead to
earn an extra $1,000 from a foreign business partner or
counterparty, with the entire $1,000 then being taxed
away by the foreign government. (The business partner
or counterparty that paid it the extra $1,000 might, for
example, be informally controlled or secretly compen-
sated by the government that got the money back in
tax revenues.)
All of a sudden, the American company would be
clearing the same $65 in pre-tax cash as previously.
However, it would also be reducing its U.S. tax bill by
$650 (the $1,000 of foreign tax credits minus the $350
U.S. tax on the extra phantom income created by not
deducting the foreign taxes). Any sophisticated ob-
server would realize that this was a tax arbitrage, fun-
damentally similar to Knetsch even though it arbitraged
tax credits against phantom income rather than current
deductions against deferred gain. As we will see, how-
ever, the Fifth Circuit in Compaq would completely
misunderstand this. Look at the big enhancement to
the pre-tax profit (it would evidently say) — obviously
this is a business deal, not a tax deal!
The tax law has responded in various ways to this
arbitrage potential. Consider, for example, section
901(i), denying the credit for taxes that are offset by a
subsidy, whether paid to the taxpayer itself, a related
party, or a transactional counterparty. Or consider the
regulation limiting foreign tax credits for taxes that
have in effect been specially allocated to the U.S. share-
holders in a foreign corporation.12
Most recently, the IRS issued Notice 98-5,13 address-
ing various instances of “foreign tax credit abuse.” Ex-
ample 1 in the Notice, its simplest illustration of an
abusive transaction, is worth reviewing briefly. An ex-
piring foreign copyright has one remaining payment
due, in the amount of $100, subject to a $30 withholding
tax. The day before this payment is due, an excess-limit
American taxpayer buys the copyright for $75. It there-
by loses $5 before U.S. tax, by reason of getting only
$70 back the next day. However, it also acquires $30 of
foreign tax credits, along with $25 of phantom U.S.
taxable income. The result, if it pays tax on the phan-
tom income at the 35 percent corporate rate but can use
all of the credits, is permanently to reduce its U.S. tax
liability by $21.25, without its really having had to do
anything other than arrange a short-lived circle of cash
flows.
For this transaction to work, the market price of the
foreign copyright must not reflect the full value of the
foreign tax credits to excess-limit U.S. taxpayers.
(Otherwise, the copyright would sell for $100 and the
deal, even if it had zero transaction costs, would merely
be an after-tax wash.) However, various taxable foreign
assets are traded in markets where the marginal pur-
chaser does not value U.S. foreign tax credits. All that
this requires is that either tax-exempts or locals (who
have no U.S. or other overseas tax liability to offset) be
the key participants in a given market. Needless to say,
there are a lot more worldwide investment dollars held
by persons in these categories than by excess-limit
American multinationals.
If transactions like Example 1 from Notice 98-5 are
allowed to work, foreign holders of taxable foreign
assets throughout the world have the equivalent of a
license to strip and sell the foreign tax credits off these
assets. The stripped-off credits would go to excess-limit
U.S. taxpayers, without requiring these taxpayers to
burden themselves with the actual economics (such as
downside risk) associated with the assets. Allowing
this would certainly be a generous act on the part of
the U.S. Treasury. It would amount to deputizing
American taxpayers to circle the globe looking for
foreign taxes for the Treasury to reimburse, up to the
point where we effectively have a territorial system for
taxing passive income. This is not, however, a policy
that very many American taxpayers are likely to relish,
apart from those doing the deals.
III. The Lower Court Decisions
The deals in Compaq and IES had a great deal in
common with Example 1. Pursuant to the ministrations
of Twenty-First Securities, the shelter promoter, the
taxpayers engaged in pre-wired deals whereby they
ostensibly bought foreign stock cum dividend and then
promptly sold it ex dividend.14 The before and after-
dividend prices differed only by the dividend net of
withholding tax, rather than reflecting the value of
foreign tax credits to excess-limit American taxpayers.
Thus, ignoring transaction costs (such as Twenty-
First’s million-dollar fee), the taxpayers ended up with
net taxable income — but also foreign tax credits — in
the amount of the foreign withholding taxes paid on
the dividends.15
In both Compaq and IES, the relevant lower court
disallowed the claimed foreign tax credits (among
other sanctions) on sham transaction grounds. In some
respects, these decisions may not have been explained
as lucidly as one might have liked. The Tax Court in
Compaq strongly tipped its hand regarding its visceral
dislike of the deals, perhaps without sufficiently ex-
plaining how its decision fit into the broader landscape
of antiabuse doctrine. The district court in IES merely
held the transaction to be a sham without further
analysis.
The Tax Court did, however, forthrightly adopt the
IRS view that the pre-tax profit requirement of existing
antiabuse law be applied after deducting foreign taxes.
This kept the test realistic in terms of how taxpayers
evaluate tax-motivated foreign tax credit deals. (No
sane taxpayer would participate in such a deal by
12Treas. reg. section 1.902-1(a)(9)(iv).
131998-1 C.B. 334, Doc 98-175 (16 pages), 97 TNT 247-3.
14More specifically, they bought American depositary
receipts (ADRs) that are used to trade foreign stock in United
States exchanges with less regulatory inconvenience.
15Specifically, the entire pre-withholding tax dividend was
taxable income, while the sale of the stock yielded a capital
loss in the amount of the after-tax dividend. Given this cap-
ital loss and section 1211, only taxpayers with substantial
capital gains to offset could benefit from the transaction.
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reason of valuing the phantom income created by dis-
regarding foreign taxes.) The Tax Court thereby
preserved the ability of the pre-tax profit test to address
deals that arbitrage foreign tax credits against phantom
taxable income, to the same extent (be it great or small)
that the test has for decades addressed deals that ar-
bitrage current deductions against excluded or
deferred income.
IV. Appellate Reversals of Compaq and IES
In holding for the taxpayer, the Eighth Circuit in IES
and then the Fifth Circuit in Compaq made three main
arguments, each of which we consider in turn.
A. Pre-Tax Profit
The main ground on which the circuit courts based
their argument pertained to their view of pre-tax profit.
They held that the United States must treat foreign
taxes and domestic taxes the same way, so that in com-
puting pre-tax profit, one ignores them both. Armed
with this view of foreign taxes, the transaction appears
profitable because Compaq is treated as receiving and
making a profit on the foreign taxes withheld from the
dividend.
The courts based their argument on Old Colony Trust
Company,16 in which we learn that there is no difference
between the income paid by an employer directly to
an employee and that paid indirectly, such as to dis-
charge the employee’s tax or any other obligations. The
withheld taxes were never received by Compaq or IES,
but under Old Colony, this makes no difference.
The Old Colony principle, however, is totally ir-
relevant to Compaq and IES. The question is not
whether gross dividends are includable in a share-
holder ’s income notwithstanding that they include
foreign taxes that have been withheld. Instead, the
question is how we should interpret “pre-tax profit”
for purposes of applying antiabuse doctrines that are
aimed at impeding certain types of economically mean-
ingless tax arbitrages that would otherwise work as
money machines draining money from the U.S. Trea-
sury. The courts’ treatment of foreign taxes opens the
door to arbitrages similar to those found in Knetsch and
Goldstein and that the economic substance, pre-tax
profit, and related doctrines are designed to prevent.
It is not a reasonable reading of these doctrines because
it guts their very purpose.
Moreover, there is no principle of tax law or good
sportsmanship that requires treating foreign taxes the
same as domestic taxes. From the taxpayer ’s perspec-
tive, which one they pay may be a matter of indif-
ference. But from the U.S. perspective, we care im-
mensely — foreign taxes are not the same as U.S. taxes.
While the foreign tax credit and other elements of the
international tax regime sometimes try to mitigate the
differences between the two, in no way are they the
same thing. The most they have in common is that they
both happened to be taxes, but this is no reason that
the pre-tax profit requirement has to treat them the
same. It is hard to make any sense of the Fifth Circuit’s
complaint that the IRS “consciously . . . stack[ed] the
deck” against finding transactions profitable in Notice
98-5, by keeping U.S. taxes but not foreign taxes out of
the pre-tax profit computation. Notice 98-5 treated
foreign taxes differently from domestic taxes because,
in the particular circumstances described in the notice,
they were different — in economic incidence (since the
U.S. taxpayer was not bearing them) as well as effect
on the revenue interest of the U.S. government.
To be sure, there are many cases where a foreign
transaction without a pre-tax profit (net of foreign
taxes) is not a sham meriting disallowance. Suppose,
for example, that a U.S. company borrows at 8 percent
to make a genuine investment, over a significant period
(say, a year), in a foreign bond or business opportunity
that is expected (subject to the standard credit or busi-
ness risks) to earn 10 percent before foreign tax and 7
percent after foreign tax. This, presumably, is not a
sham, despite the lack of pre-tax profit as computed
net of foreign tax. The taxpayer actually took an eco-
nomic position in a deal that was not pre-wired or
transitory like the supposed investment in Compaq. The
taxpayer also bears the cost of the foreign tax, unlike
Compaq. By contrast, the ADR trades were designed
so that the payment of foreign taxes was economically
irrelevant to the taxpayer. The taxpayer who borrows
to make a real investment in foreign bonds therefore
needs relief from double taxation, unlike Compaq.
All this shows, however, is the need to examine the
overall facts and circumstances, rather than focusing
excessively on a single indicator such as pre-tax profit.
Borrowing at 8 percent to hold municipal bonds that
pay at 6 percent is not inherently a sham transaction.
And likewise, what made the transaction in Goldstein
a sham was not just the expected pre-tax loss but the
fact that the transaction reflected not “mixed motives”
as between tax and nontax, but an absence of “pur-
posive activity,” taxes aside.17
Discussions of pre-tax profit, in some ways, are al-
ways surreal. The only meaningful number is after-tax
profits. Perhaps this is why the courts got so confused.
The pre-tax profit doctrine is not designed to measure
some ultimate economic value. Instead, it is supposed
to help sort socially harmful tax arbitrages from real
business transactions, and it must be interpreted in this
light. The courts failed to understand this and, as a
16279 U.S. 716 (1929).
17Goldstein, 364 F.2d at 741. Given the limited significance
of the pre-tax profit test as merely an input into the inquiry
into economic substance, we do not wish to be too doctrinaire
about the “right” way to compute it. Thus, one could just as
well say either (a) pre-tax profit is always computed net of
foreign taxes, but a transaction will not be treated as a sham
absent other indicia of its lacking economic substance, or (b)
pre-tax profit is computed gross of foreign taxes except where
there are other indicia of a lack of economic substance that
indicate a need to compute it net of foreign taxes. Regardless
of which approach one takes, it is important to remember the
role of the test as one of a number of filtering devices designed
to help taxpayers, the IRS, and the courts identify illegitimate
transactions.
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result, misapplied the doctrine to allow precisely what
it is designed to prevent.
Whatever the unstated rationale, the Fifth Circuit
effectively treated the intent to arbitrage phantom tax-
able income against foreign tax credits, to shelter other
income from U.S. tax, as itself evidence of the requisite
nontax business purpose. The tax planning therefore
bizarrely validated itself, even though it was concep-
tually the same as arbitraging current deductions
against deferred or excluded income for identical shel-
tering purposes, as in cases such as Knetsch.
What the courts in Compaq and IES
had to say about economic risk was
no less misguided than their
discussion of pre-tax profit. 
The Fifth Circuit closed its embarrassing critique of
the IRS position on pre-tax profit by stating that in
Compaq itself, “[a]lthough the United States lost $2.7
million in tax revenues as a result of the transaction,
that is only because the Netherlands gained $3.4 mil-
lion in tax revenues.” This is entirely mistaken. The
Dutch were going to get their $3.4 million whether
Compaq engaged in the ADR transaction or not. They
did not get the revenues “as a result of the transaction.”
All that was at issue was whether the United States
would in effect rebate the Dutch taxes. And it is hard
to see why we should want to rebate foreign withhold-
ing taxes on dividends when no U.S. taxpayer has
either held an economically significant position in the
stock or borne the taxes economically.
B. Economic Risk
What the courts in Compaq and IES had to say about
economic risk was no less misguided than their discus-
sion of pre-tax profit. On the topic of risk, the decisions
have two main themes. First, they turn prior antiabuse
doctrine on its head, by treating the avoidance of risk,
rather than the acceptance of risk, as the harbinger of
nontax business purpose and consequent legitimacy.
Thus, IES, in language that Compaq cites approvingly,
states that the taxpayer’s “disinclination to accept any
more risk than necessary . . . strikes us as an exercise
of good business judgment consistent with a subjective
intent to treat the ADR trades as money-making trans-
actions.”18
One pities poor Mr. Knetsch, who did not find a
court perceptive enough to realize that he must have
been engaged in a legitimate business deal because he
borrowed the $4 million nonrecourse. From a broader
standpoint, of course the courts were right that it
makes sense for taxpayers to limit risks that they do
not want to bear. But this is a complete non sequitur
with regard to how one should apply antiavoidance
doctrines. The economic substance and business pur-
pose requirements focus on economic risk — those the
taxpayer bears, not those she manages to avoid — as
a filter and to deter pure paper-shuffling that serves
solely to generate tax benefits.
The reading of the risk requirement in these cases
gets it about as wrong as one can. They treat eliminat-
ing risk as a sign of legitimacy. Transactions can be
completely pre-wired, and yet treated as exposing tax-
payers to sufficient risk precisely because risk is
eliminated. Both bearing risk and eliminating risk
satisfy the doctrine, rendering it meaningless.
Second, the courts claimed that the taxpayers actual-
ly did bear risks that “were not by any means insig-
nificant.”  Supposedly, market prices could have
changed in mid-transaction; “any of the individual
trades could have been broken up or, for that matter,
could have been executed incorrectly; and the dividend
might not have been paid” or might have differed from
the pre-announced amount.19 For that  matter, an
asteroid might have struck the Earth in mid-transac-
tion, making the transaction by no means risk-free.
In fact, the Compaq and IES transactions appear to
have been complete shams. According to the expert
report in IES, the purchase and sales prices in the trans-
actions were pre-arranged.20 Before the consummation
of the first leg of the transaction (in which IES pur-
chased ADRs from the counterparty cum-dividend),
IES agreed to the terms of the second leg (in which IES
sold the same ADRs to the counterparty ex-dividend).
The Tax Court in Compaq similarly found that the trans-
actions were “predetermined and designed . . . to yield
a specific result and to eliminate all economic risks and
influences from outside market forces on the purchases
and sales in the ADR transaction.”21 The circuit courts
ignored these facts. If they had not done so, however,
they evidently would have viewed this pre-wiring as
validating the transactions all the more, by demon-
strating IES’s and Compaq’s good business sense.
C. Genuine Multiparty Transaction
The final ground on which the courts in Compaq and
IES reversed the Tax Court was that the ADR transac-
tions “had not been conducted by alter egos or by straw
entities created by the taxpayer simply for the purpose
of facilitating the transactions. Instead, ‘all of the par-
ties involved were entities separate and apart from the
taxpayer, doing legitimate business before . . . [the
ADR trades] and (as far as we know) continuing such
legitimate business after that time.’ Each individual
ADR trade was an arm’s length transaction.”22
This, of course, was equally true in Knetsch. The
taxpayer in that case had no relationship to the life
insurance company that sold him the deal. It presum-
ably engaged in the life insurance business both before
and afterwards. The government did not argue that the
parties had agreed to anything but an arm’s length
interest rate on either of the transaction’s two offsetting
18IES at 355; Compaq at 15.
19Compaq at 24. See also IES at 355.
20See Affidavit of Defendant’s Expert Economist David J.
Ross, in the district court record in IES.
21Compaq, 113 T.C. at 219.
22Compaq at 15-16 (partly quoting IES at 356).
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legs. And it agreed that the asset he purported to pur-
chase had genuine legal existence under state law.
It is true that the use of alter egos and straw entities
is sometimes an important element in sham transac-
tions, and one that the courts will focus on.23 But, since
it is only one mechanism for sham, and entirely un-
necessary to the construction of tax arbitrages that lack
nontax significance, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits were
not entitled to crow as they did about the absence of
these mechanisms here.
V. Possible Consequences of the Decisions
We do not want to make too much of a pair of
erroneous opinions by appellate courts. Compaq and
IES might end up merely being added to the list of
pro-taxpayer cases that appear in the string cites of
legal briefs and judicial decisions. Moreover, at their
narrowest, the decisions apply only to pre-1997 divi-
dend strips. The loophole that allowed the transactions
has been closed. What is more, transactions designed
to transfer tax benefits to those who can make the best
use of them are in a sense mundane, since they are done
every day through leasing transactions, partnership
special allocations, and the like.
Nonetheless, even under a narrow reading, Compaq
and IES are bad news. They add to the vicious circle
whereby taxpayers rush to exploit flaws in the law,
leading to legislation designed to eliminate the flaws
once exposed. The decisions strengthen incentives to
discover the next shelter, in the hope that it will work
until corrective legislation that is directly on point
takes effect. Aggressive tax shelter promoters stay in
business due to decisions like this. Even at their most
narrow, Compaq and IES are abdications of the courts’
responsibility in the tax system.
Moreover, the decisions are unlikely to be so limited.
Section 901(k) applies only to dividends. As noted
above, other types of payments that may be subject to
foreign withholding taxes, such as royalties, leases, in-
terest coupons, and other payments, can also be
stripped. Compaq and IES open the door to a broad
array of foreign tax credit planning. More generally in
the foreign area, the decisions water down, if not
eliminate, the pre-tax profit requirement, by measuring
profits gross of foreign taxes. Money-losing transac-
tions can thereby be treated as profitable, with the
underlying tax arbitrage that they exploit to shelter
other income absurdly validating the deals.
The decisions will also have consequences for
domestic tax planning, particularly regarding the busi-
ness purpose requirement and the risk component of
the economic substance requirement. If treated as au-
thoritative, Compaq and IES effectively eliminate the
risk requirement from the law. They also treat what no
sane person would have done absent taxes as having
sufficient business purpose. These were purely tax-
motivated transactions, manufactured by a promoter
and sold to taxpayers who cared not a whit about the
nontax effects (except to ensure that they were negli-
gible). The courts’ versions of the risk and business
purpose requirements could apply far outside foreign
tax credits — for example, to purely domestic financial
transactions and partnership transactions, both of
which are fertile soil for shelters.
Finally, atmospherics matter. The perception that
taxpayers can get away with money-losing deals that
are completely pre-wired may cause a rush to market
beyond the obvious trading of foreign tax credits.
What should be done? Perhaps the government
should try to take the case to the Supreme Court. We
have no confidence that the Supreme Court will do any
better given its recent decision in Gitlitz,24 but it might
be worth the gamble. If the government does decide to
try, we believe that Compaq is clearly worthy of cer-
tiorari. Apart from its freestanding importance, it is
significantly at odds with the approach to corporate
tax shelters taken by other circuits, such as the Third
Circuit in ACM.
Compaq and IES show that disclosure
alone is not sufficient to shut down
tax shelters. If the deals work even
when challenged and litigated,
disclosure is nothing more than free
publicity. 
The courts’ misguided and potentially dangerous
view of pre-tax profit should not be allowed to stand.
If the Supreme Court does not grant certiorari and
reverse, then the IRS and Tax Court, in cases appealable
to other circuits, should stick to their guns. Moreover, the
Treasury should not hesitate to use its regulatory author-
ity (as it suggested it would in Notice 98-5) to give added
legal muscle to the IRS position on pre-tax profit in
foreign tax credit deals. Finally, Congress should consider
addressing this matter legislatively. Any such legislation
should be retroactive, to prevent making this yet one
more case in the vicious circle of shelters followed by
prospective legislation followed by more shelters. Any
claim that taxpayers did not have fair warning would
be specious in light of Notice 98-5.
Compaq and IES also show that disclosure alone is
not sufficient to shut down tax shelters. If the deals
work even when challenged and litigated, disclosure
is nothing more than free publicity. The view that it is
sufficient requires taking a Panglossian view of likely
judicial outcomes, and these cases may disabuse us of
any such notion.
Although we are sympathetic to disclosure that
helps IRS auditors to understand and trace transac-
tions, what is needed as well is legislation enacting
strong substantive antiabuse rules. We take no view
here on the particular form of these rules. Treasury’s
proposed codification may have had flaws, and per-
haps the doctrines should deliberately be left vague,
23See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, supra note 10. 24531 U.S. 206 (2001).
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like the common law. But at a minimum, the Compaq
court’s version of the risk requirement and pre-tax
profit requirement should be overturned. Moreover,
the legislation should require significant economic
substance and a dominant business purpose for a
transaction to be respected (in addition to clarifying
that pre-tax profit, to the extent relied on, is to be
determined net of foreign taxes). This would be a
change from current law, unlike prior proposed
codifications of antiabuse doctrines that claimed to
merely restate current law, but it is a change that is
necessary.
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